Sistema de comércio marítimo do oceano índico

Terra de fogo.
A terra está lutando para se manter vivo. Derramamentos em massa, desencadeados por ataque antrópico e precipitação de sistemas de defesa planetária compensando o impacto, poderiam começar a qualquer momento!
Marcado com o Oceano Índico.
Ciclone Tropical STAN: Red Alert Emitido em WA.
Ventos destrutivos, tempestades, inundações ameaçam cidades quando o ciclone se aproxima da Austrália Ocidental.
O ciclone tropical STAN ameaça a região noroeste de Pilbara, na Austrália Ocidental (WA), com rajadas de vento potencialmente destrutivas e chuvas intensas quando o sistema chega ao continente, no início da manhã de domingo.
A tempestade, atualmente um sistema de categoria 2, deve se intensificar para o ciclone de categoria três antes do landfall. Alerta vermelho foi emitido para comunidades costeiras entre Port Hedland e Wallal, incluindo Pardoo, Eighty Mile e Wallal. Os surtos de tempestades podem representar ameaças adicionais de ondas prejudiciais e inundações perigosas devido à maré, disse o Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) da Austrália. Para as atualizações mais recentes, visite o site da BOM.
M6.5 Quake atinge o mar de Andaman perto das ilhas Nicobar.
PERIGO SÍSMICO.
Forte Quake, Aftershocks significativos ocorrem em Mohean, Nicobar Islands.
Centrado em 7.769 ° N, 94.325 °, o terremoto atingiu uma profundidade de cerca de 10 km na sexta-feira, 21 de abril de 2014 às 13:41:07 UTC, de acordo com o USGS / EHP.
Pelo menos 8 réplicas significativas seguidas, como de postagem.
Mapa de Explicação para Sismotectônica da Região de Sumatra (parcial). Fonte: USGS.
Hora do evento: 2014-03-21 13:41:07 UTC.
Localização: 7.769 ° N 94.325 ° E profundidade = 10.0km (6.2mi)
113km (70mi) E de Mohean, Índia 234km (NNW) de Sabang, na Indonésia.
Super BRUCE Winds Alcance 265 km / h.
EVENTO CLIMÁTICO EXTREMO.
Tempestade Super Ciclônica BRUCE intensificou-se para ventos de 265km / h.
Tempestade Super Ciclônica Os ventos máximos sustentados do BRUCE atingiram uma velocidade máxima de 265 km / h com rajadas de cerca de 315 km / h mais cedo hoje, de acordo com os modelos FIRE-EARTH.
Às 13: 00UTC, o Super BRUCE posicionou-se próximo de 19,0ºS 78,0ºE, acompanhando o WSW a cerca de 20km / h e gerando uma altura de onda máxima significativa de cerca de 15 metros.
Tempestade Super Ciclônica BRUCE. Vapor de água [FIRE-EARTH Enhancement] Imagem de satélite - gravada às 12: 30UTC em 22 de dezembro de 2013. A massa no canto inferior esquerdo é o Cyclone AMARA. O original Image Sourced from: CIMSS / SSEC / WISC.
[Créditos e confirmações: os modelos FIRE-EARTH inserem dados de vários satélites e fontes, incluindo ESA, NOAA, JTWC & # 8230;]
Links Relacionados.
BRUCE Torna-se uma Tempestade Super Ciclônica 21 de dezembro de 2013 BRUCE pode Intensificar uma Tempestade Super Ciclônica 20 de dezembro de 2013 Ciclones Tropicais AMARA e BRUCE 19 de dezembro de 2013.
BRUCE Torna-se uma Super Tempestade Ciclônica.
EVENTO CLIMÁTICO EXTREMO.
BRUCE é agora um Super Cyclonic Storm com 0.8 de certeza.
Os modelos FIRE-EARTH mostram que a BRUCE fortaleceu-se para uma tempestade ciclônica superior com 80% de certeza, com ventos de mais de 255 km / h em cerca de 04: 00UTC em 21 de dezembro de 2013.
Posição: perto de 15,0ºS, 84,3ºE.
Ventos sustentáveis ​​máximos: 255+ km / h.
Rajada máxima do vento: 320 km / h.
Altura Significativa da Onda: 15m.
Movimento: WSW (250 graus) a 25 km / h.
[Nota: os modelos FIRE-EARTH inserem dados de várias fontes, incluindo ESA, NOAA, JTWC e outros.]
Tempestade Super Ciclônica BRUCE. VIS / SWIR [MELHORAMENTO DE INCÊNDIO] Imagem de satélite - gravado às 04: 30UTC do dia 21 de dezembro de 2013. Imagem original Proveniente de: CIMSS / SSEC / WISC.
Ponto sem retorno.
Em 2004, nossa equipe previu um aumento de 80% a 90% na potência total dissipada anualmente por ciclones tropicais nos oceanos Atlântico e Pacífico até 2015.
As tempestades continuarão a ficar mais fortes (desenvolverão maiores intensidades médias) e sobreviverão em alta intensidade por mais tempo (levará mais tempo para dissipar o pico de energia), resultando em aumentos substanciais nas perdas relacionadas a tempestades no futuro próximo.
[1. Primeiro rascunho publicado pelo MSRB na Internet em 26 de fevereiro de 2005]
BRUCE poderia intensificar uma tempestade super cíclica.
O ciclone BRUCE poderia fortalecer a um Super Cyclonic Storm & # 8211; probabilidade: 0,23.
Os modelos FIRE-EARTH mostram que o Cyclone BRUCE poderia potencialmente se intensificar para uma tempestade super ciclônica com ventos sustentados de aproximadamente 255 km / h com probabilidade de 23%.
Localização aproximada do ciclone BRUCE a partir de 07: 00UTC em 20 de dezembro de 2013 marcado no mapa CIMMS SST.
Estimativas FIRE-EARTH & # 8211; às 11: 00UTC em 20 de dezembro de 2013.
O ciclone AMARA (TC 03S) estava localizado próximo a 18,5ºS, 64,9ºE com ventos de aproximadamente 215Km / hr. O ciclone BRUCE (TC 04S) estava localizado próximo a 13,8 ° S, 87,7 ° E com ventos sustentados de aproximadamente 230 km / h.
Ciclones AMARA (TC 03S) e BRUCE (TC 04S). IS / SWIR [MELHORAMENTO DE INCÊNDIO] Imagem de satélite - gravado às 09: 30UTC em 20 de dezembro de 2013. Fonte original da imagem: CIMSS / SSEC / WISC.

Linguista Balochi.
Um blog baseado no Balochistan para estudo de pesquisa acadêmica.
O comércio de escravos do século XIX no Oceano Índico Ocidental: o papel dos mercenários do Báltico1.
Por Profa Dr Beatrice Nicolini.
Faculdade de Ciências Políticas e Sociais.
Universidade Católica do Sagrado Coração.
Profa Dra Beatrice Nicolini.
Durante milênios, os ventos de monção e uma rede de comunidades interagentes criaram um complexo sistema comercial integrado no Oceano Índico ocidental. Juntamente com bens e pessoas, as idéias religiosas fluíam através de rotas de comércio de curta e longa distância na região. Essas redes de intercâmbio incluíam grandes rotas de escravos, e entendimentos culturais e religiosos compartilhados influenciavam a forma como os escravos eram conceituados e usados.
Como na África, a escravidão desempenhou um papel significativo no mundo islâmico. Os exércitos de maioria dos soldados escravos turcos foram criados no Cáucaso e nas estepes da Ásia Central, enquanto os escravos domésticos vieram principalmente da faixa costeira da África Oriental subsaariana. Baloch se envolveu neste comércio de escravos em grande parte através de sua associação militar com os árabes de Omã. No século XVIII, os omanis começaram a recrutar tropas mercenárias das tribos de Baloch. Esses Baloch desenvolveram uma tradição armada duradoura e se tornaram um elemento-chave nas equações de poder dentro das áreas de influência de Omã na África Oriental subsaariana, tanto na costa quanto no interior.
Este estudo examina o papel que Baloch desempenhou na África Oriental subsaariana durante o século XIX. Centra-se nas ilhas de Zanzibar e Pemba, onde o poder dos árabes de Omã atingiu um apogeu. Discute a sua influência nos sistemas sociais, políticos e económicos da África Oriental.
Uma vez que os Omanis consolidaram seu poder militar em áreas da África Oriental subsaariana, os Baloch estavam entre os que lá se estabeleceram e durante meados e finais do século 19 estavam ligados ao comércio de escravos e à mercadoria mais lucrativa do dia, o marfim.
O papel do Baloch na África Oriental durante o século XIX impactou as sociedades locais e seus valores e contribuiu para a transformação dos costumes tradicionais. Quando os britânicos começaram a restringir o tráfico de escravos da África em meados do século XIX, a Ásia assumiu maior importância como fonte de escravos para venda à Arábia e à Pérsia. Mais uma vez, Baloch desempenharia um papel considerável nesse comércio.
1. Escravidão no mundo islâmico e na África oriental.
1.1 Escravidão da África para a Ásia.
Houve uma série de rotas de escravos significativas em todo o Oceano Índico Ocidental durante o século 19 (HOURANI 1995: 89). Estes são geralmente divididos em dois fluxos principais. Uma era do sul para o norte, isto é, da costa da África Oriental e do Mar Vermelho até a Península Arábica, e depois para a Índia ocidental e o Sul da Ásia Central. O outro estava na direção oposta. Consequentemente, os escravos não eram apenas negros da África, mas também de origem asiática.
Os escravos da África eram proeminentes na história do mundo islâmico e além. No final do século IX escravos negros da África Oriental, os Zanj, que eram empregados principalmente em plantações de cana de açúcar, se revoltaram contra o califa abássida al-Mu'tamid e se tornaram mestres do sul do Iraque e Basra (POPOVIC 1999, FURLONGE 1999). Por volta de meados do século 11, houve um extenso comércio de escravos para a China a partir de Pemba e Ras Assir, na costa norte da Somália (conhecida como o Cabo dos Escravos), em troca de cerâmica e bens de luxo. Escravos da África Oriental foram importados em grande número para a Península Arábica, viajando em dardos árabes (AGIUS 2002, 2005; GILBERT 2004). Quando o tráfico de escravos da África Ocidental para as Américas foi banido em meados do século XIX, houve um comércio extensivo e crescente de escravos da África Oriental de Ras Asir e Pemba.2 Eles foram comprados com tecidos e datas nas Ilhas Zanzibar e Pemba e transportados para a Península Arábica onde estavam.
empenhado principalmente na pesca de pérolas no Golfo Pérsico / Árabe (SHERIFF 2005: 35-45). Em alguns casos, os escravos da África Oriental também se tornaram senhores dos reinos africanos locais (por exemplo, governadores de portos de Guardafui a Cabo Delgado) porque seus mestres árabes os consideravam muito mais leais do que qualquer um dentro de seus próprios clãs e tribos.
No Oriente Médio, na Ásia Central e na África Oriental, as funções sociais, políticas e econômicas dos escravos eram geralmente divididas em três categorias: a) doméstica - patriarcal, b) produtiva - agrícola e c) militar - administrativa. Enquanto essas categorias gerais estavam presentes, o tráfico de escravos praticado na costa leste da África tinha suas características distintas. Na África Oriental, os escravos formavam uma casta separada. Eles eram considerados menos que humanos e, mesmo quando abraçavam o islamismo, eram menos do que muçulmanos. Havia três categorias de escravos na região: 1) watumwa wajinga, que não foram assimilados nas populações costeiras; 2) escravos que foram transportados quando crianças para Zanzibar; e 3) mzalia (pl. wazalia), que nasceram no litoral e se aculturaram completamente na cultura islâmica costeira (POWELS 2000: 251-271).
A escravidão na África Oriental era regulada pelos princípios da lei do Alcorão e os escravos que não vinham de áreas de influência cultural suaíli eram chamados de mshenzi (pl. Washenzi), o que significa "pagão, bárbaro, incivilizado". Eles não eram muçulmanos, ao contrário da maioria dos swahili.
No entanto, ao longo da costa Swahili, a escravidão era um sistema muito absorvente. Os escravos domésticos desfrutavam das condições mais privilegiadas. Suas relações com os donos se assemelhavam mais aos membros da família do que itens de propriedade. Os homens eram chamados ndugu yangu, meu irmão, e as mulheres eram suria, concubinas, de seus donos ou nannies. Nas plantações de especiarias e coqueiros em Zanzibar e ao longo das costas, os escravos domésticos frequentemente se tornaram os guardiões msimamizi, ou nokoa, kadamu, os primeiros ou os segundos escravos-chefes. Outros tinham a tarefa de levar caravanas para o interior.
Os escravos também trabalhavam nas plantações de seus donos, chamados de mashamba3 (LODHI 2000: 46-47). Lá, eles trabalhavam nos campos, peneiravam copal e transportavam mercadorias para os portos. Alguns receberam um pedaço de terra com o qual se sustentar. Eles trabalhavam nesses lotes às quintas e sextas-feiras, os dois dias de descanso. Os mais privilegiados cultivavam seu próprio pequeno pedaço de terra, pagando uma homenagem anual ou mensal ao seu senhor (GLASSMAN, 1995, p. 79-114). Eles também foram autorizados, mediante o pagamento de um imposto, a se casarem.4 Durante o século XIX, no entanto, a maioria dos escravos do interior do continente, como as regiões de Unyanyembe e dos Grandes Lagos, estava destinada a trabalhar nas plantações, e consequentemente totalmente excluídos de qualquer chance de generosidade paternalista de seus mestres (PÉTRÉ-GRENOUILLEAU 2004, CLARENCE-SMITH 2006).
Nos centros urbanos havia a instituição do vibarua (pl. De kibarua) 'escravos contratados pelo dia'. Eles eram extremamente pobres, mas em alguns casos eles se juntaram às caravanas dos árabes Hadrami e foram capazes de melhorar suas condições humilhantes. Os escravos comerciais, artesãos mafundi, também alcançaram certo nível de dignidade, mas permaneceram sob estrito controle de seu mestre. Quaisquer iniciativas ilegais ou pessoais foram severamente punidas.
Na escravidão da África Oriental, as plantações comerciais abasteciam os mercados em crescimento da Europa (HEUMAN, 1999): a demanda européia induziu os fazendeiros africanos ricos a introduzir novas indústrias agrícolas altamente lucrativas. Estes incluem cana-de-açúcar, arroz, copal, baunilha, pimenta, cardamomo, noz-moscada e - especialmente em Zanzibar e Pemba - cravo. As comunidades mercantis indianas, tanto hindus quanto muçulmanas, estavam envolvidas no desenvolvimento dessa economia de plantation e no comércio desses produtos em todo o Oceano Índico ocidental. Muitos tornaram-se extremamente ricos e poderosos como resultado (BARENDSE, 2001; MARKOVITS, 2000). Como não havia classe camponesa local que pudesse ser empregada nas plantações, os escravos negros eram rotineiramente usados ​​para cultivar a terra e realizar trabalhos pesados ​​nas plantações. Assim, quando a Inglaterra empreendeu a cruzada contra a escravidão, foi precisamente essa parte mais miserável da sociedade que constituiu os fundamentos econômicos de toda a região.
2. Os árabes de Omã e Baloch no Oceano Índico ocidental.
Até as primeiras explorações britânicas em torno do século XVIII, o Baluchistão era terra incógnita para os ocidentais, uma terra desconhecida e um lugar vazio nos mapas do período. Durante os séculos XVIII e XIX, Baloch era conhecido pelos representantes britânicos na índia como ferozes freebooters. Nesta época, as tribos baloquitas da região costeira de Makran foram empurradas pela extrema pobreza para a Pérsia e as costas da Arábia (REDAELLI 2003). Aqui, eles se ofereceram como soldados, marinheiros e guarda-costas, que, embora modestos, poderiam representar a diferença entre a vida e a morte de suas famílias. Durante o século XIX as condições de vida dessas pessoas foram tão duras que o explorador britânico Sykes escreveu: "elas são adscripti glebae e em condições miseráveis, recebendo nominalmente um terço da colheita" apenas o suficiente para manter o corpo e alma juntos & # 8221; (SYKES 1902: 108).
Foi através de tais arranjos que os guerreiros Baloch passaram a ser associados às dinastias omanis. Esses laços datam, pelo menos, das dinastias Ya'rubi dos séculos XVI e XVII e cresceram em importância sob o al-Bu Said no século XVIII.
Graças ao parentesco semelhante e às estruturas tribais de ambas as sociedades, que resultaram de suas tradições nômades, os Omanis podiam contar com a solidariedade & # 8222; de seus mercenários Makrani. Essa solidariedade sempre teve um preço, no entanto (NICOLINI 2002:
As tribos baloquitas que apoiavam os poderosos sultões árabes de Omã em Makran inicialmente esperavam receber apoio militar contra as tribos rivais. Esse apoio muitas vezes não se concretizou, e al-Bu Said enviou principalmente o Baloch em expedições militares para os desertos de Omã ou empregou-os nos navios baseados em seu porto comercial de Muscat. Em 1794, o sultão bin Ahmad al-Bu Said obteve os direitos sobre as receitas de Bandar Abbas e seus domínios, que incluíam Minab e as ilhas de Qishm, Hormuz e Hengam, do xeque da tribo Beni Ma'in. No início do século XIX, as possessões dos al-Bu Said incluíam a ilha do Bahrein, a costa de Makran, com seu importante enclave estratégico-comercial de Gwadar, certos locais ao longo da costa persa, como Chabahar, a ilha de Socotra. , as ilhas Curia Muria, Zanzibar e portos próximos na costa da África Subsaariana. Através da negociação, bem como incontáveis ​​atos de pirataria e ferozes lutas pelo poder5, os al-Bu Said expandiram sua influência em todo o Oceano Índico Ocidental (DAVIES, 1997). O BARENDSE 2001 sugere que o comércio e as relações tribais entre a costa suaíli e o litoral do Baluchistão-Makran antecedeu a ascensão dos al-Bu Said, mas eles aumentaram quando os al-Bu Said consolidaram seu poder. Os al-Bu Said perceberam que sua sobrevivência estava intimamente ligada com as riquezas da África Oriental, e em 1840 o al-Bu Sa'id Sultan Said Sayyid al-Bu Sa'id (nascido em 1791, reinado de 1806, morreu 1856) mudou sua capital de Muscat para Zanzibar.
Devido à expansão mercantil e política árabe-omanense ao longo dos litorais da África Oriental, muitos balequins estabeleceram-se nas cidades portuárias da África Oriental e nas ilhas de Zanzibar e Pemba, o coração dos domínios africanos de Omã durante o século XIX. Dos relatos de viajantes, exploradores e oficiais europeus da época, as tribos baloquitas da África Oriental incluíam o Quente, o Rind e o Nausherwani (MILES 1981: 97-112).
Enquanto estas eram as principais tribos de Makran (a casca, em particular, eram consideradas de sangue azul de Balaque) e, portanto, figuravam mais proeminentemente nas fontes britânicas, parece provável que outras tribos baloquitas também estivessem presentes. Seus descendentes ainda estão presentes lá hoje e são chamados Bulushi em Kiswahili.
Tal como acontece com as tribos de Omã, os mercenários balúchis ao longo da costa suaíli serviram como força militar, embora pareça que também se envolveram nas relações comerciais da África Oriental. Naquela época, as ilhas de Zanzibar e Pemba eram administradas por governadores que representavam Said Sayyid bin Sultan al-Bu Said e exerciam o poder em seu nome. O apoio militar que sustentava a autoridade dos governadores sobre as ilhas e seus assuntos eram tropas especiais de confiabilidade comprovada, isto é, o corpo mercenário de Baloch intimamente ligado aos al-Bu Said. Os governadores que representavam senhores omanenses na maior liderança dos portos comerciais da África Oriental também contavam com o apoio da aristocracia suaíli autóctone, que eram principalmente mercadores. Eles estavam ligados à elite de Omã por interesses mútuos na exploração dos recursos na região (GLASSMAN, 1991). Esse império mercantil transferiu seu centro de gravidade econômica e política para Zanzibar, tornando o controle das ilhas vizinhas e da costa africana vizinha uma das pedras angulares de seu vasto sistema de interesses mercantis. Tanto é assim que, muitos anos depois, o explorador inglês Richard Francis Burton afirmaria que: "Se você toca flauta em Zanzibar, vai soar até os Grandes Lagos"; # 8221; (NICOLINI 2004: 119).
3. Omã, Grã-Bretanha e Zanzibar.
A rivalidade européia no Golfo e as águas ocidentais do Oceano Índico desde o início do século XIX também tiveram um impacto decisivo nas rotas marítimas da região e seu imenso tráfego comercial, particularmente o tráfico de escravos. Claramente, no entanto, a capacidade do soberano omanense de explorar tais contingências políticas também teve um certo peso.
Em questão, havia duas visões de mundo profundamente diferentes e formas de perceber objetivos e estratégias. De um lado estava um príncipe mercantil árabe-omani com sua corte tradicional de conselheiros, guerreiros, mercadores e escravos, e do outro lado estava a Grã-Bretanha, uma grande potência européia. Como resultado de uma pressão pública acentuada, os britânicos lançaram uma cruzada contra o tráfico de escravos e os traficantes de escravos. Esse empreendimento teria o efeito de rasgar pelas raízes os fundamentos econômicos de toda a região do Oceano Índico Ocidental e de revolucionar tanto os mecanismos do poder local quanto a cultura tradicional. Enquanto os europeus tinham tecnologia superior e poder militar, o príncipe mercador de Muscat e Zanzibar, Said Bin Sultan al-Bu Said, era adepto de manipular os alinhamentos políticos na região.
No século 19, a demanda por escravos da África Oriental vinha principalmente da Península Arábica, onde o cultivo de tamareiras exigia uma oferta contínua de trabalho. Havia também demanda do oeste da Índia, onde escravos eram empregados em oásis e plantações de cana de açúcar e chá; da Ásia Central, onde o algodão estava começando a ser cultivado, de várias regiões do Império Otomano; e do continente americano. A demanda foi especialmente alta para mulheres jovens e meninas.
sirva em lares, assim como em eunucos. Os escravos destinados aos tribunais recebiam treinamento especial para entreter convidados importantes cantando e dançando.
A Grã-Bretanha foi a primeira nação a empreender uma campanha internacional com objetivos humanitários. Criou, no entanto, um nó pesado e complexo para desvendar: como combater a escravidão e ao mesmo tempo manter alianças com os poderosos protetores dos traficantes de escravos, como o sultão omanense, que obtiveram seus maiores lucros precisamente do comércio de seres humanos. carne? O comércio de escravos, portanto, representou um elemento altamente desestabilizador para a política britânica, não apenas no plano político, mas também social e econômico. Durante o século XIX, a crescente eficácia das medidas britânicas visando a abolição restringiu a disponibilidade de escravos da África Oriental. Esse déficit foi parcialmente compensado por escravos asiáticos que viajavam em rotas alternativas e pouco conhecidas de escravos no Oceano Índico ocidental. Uma dessas rotas foi através do Baluchistão, como mostra o comércio do povo asiático de Makran destinado a ser vendido nas praças da Arábia e da Pérsia durante as primeiras décadas do século XX.
Neste ponto, é útil discutir outros fatores importantes que desempenharam um papel no impressionante crescimento econômico-comercial da África Oriental em certos momentos: marfim (YLVISAKER 1982: 221-231) e cravo. A partir do século II aC, o marfim foi exportado da África oriental para o Mediterrâneo. A partir do século 7 dC, a Índia e a China surgiram como os principais mercados para o marfim do leste da África. Superior ao marfim asiático em qualidade, consistência e cor, o marfim africano deixou Moçambique e seguiu as rotas marítimas do Oceano Índico até o final do século XVIII. No início do século XIX, os portugueses impuseram novos impostos e outras cargas fiscais e impostos sobre o comércio, que Abdul SHERIFF 1987: 81 termos "suicidas". Juntamente com a ascendência mercantil da França e da Grã-Bretanha no Oceano Índico, isso causou uma mudança no comércio de marfim. Os portos de Moçambique continuaram a enviar marfim, mas em quantidades menores, enquanto Zanzibar se tornou o principal centro do lucrativo comércio deste precioso material (PRESTHOLDT 2004, MACHADO 2005).
A partir da segunda década do século XIX, a Europa entrou no mercado de marfim com sua considerável demanda. O marfim africano - branco puro, forte, mas facilmente trabalhado - era cada vez mais procurado no Ocidente para itens de luxo, como bolas de bilhar, teclas de piano, jóias elaboradas, ventiladores, talheres, acessórios de vestuário e itens elegantes de toalete pessoal. Na atmosfera carregada de um fin de siècle Europa cada vez mais fascinado por chineses ou outros itens exóticos, o marfim era uma obrigação. Isto é claramente demonstrado pelo fato de que as importações britânicas de marfim subiram de 280 toneladas em 1840 para 800 toneladas em 1875.
A economia do interior do leste africano testemunhou, assim, um imenso crescimento na demanda de pagazi, carregadores de caravanas, homens livres recrutados dentre as tribos africanas aliadas (principalmente Yao e Nyamwezi), e por carregadores de escravos (ROCKEL 2000). : 173-195) .7 As mulheres também foram forçadas pelos comerciantes de escravos Omani e pelos soldados e guarda-costas do Baloch a abandonar os seus filhos para transportar presas de elefante.
Não menos importante que o marfim foi a extraordinária expansão do cultivo de cravo-da-índia nas ilhas de Zanzibar e Pemba. A criação de um novo nicho para exploração agrícola foi destinada a transformar as ilhas gêmeas em um verdadeiro império comercial.
De acordo com as publicações inglesas da época, no final do século XVIII, a introdução de cravos (eugenya caryophyllata) alterou completamente o potencial econômico e comercial da produção de plantações, não apenas aos olhos dos europeus, mas também dos olhos dos Omanis. - Arab Sultan e as comunidades mercantis indianas em Zanzibar.
Desde o século II aC, enviados de Java, na corte Han da China, sugavam cravo-da-índia para adoçar o hálito pesado de alho durante as audiências com o imperador. As plantas de cravo-da-índia, originárias das Molucas, foram exploradas pela primeira vez pelos holandeses, que compreenderam o valor comercial desta preciosa especiaria perfumada, que também possui propriedades medicinais. Por volta de 1770, o comerciante francês Pierre Poivre conseguiu obter algumas sementes para iniciar o cultivo nas Ilhas Mascarenhas. Por isso, foram os franceses que, no início do século XIX, introduziram cravo-da-índia em Zanzibar. Essas tentativas iniciais foram bem sucedidas. O ambiente era perfeitamente adequado para este cultivo e, eventualmente, Zanzibar tornou-se o principal produtor de cravo do mundo.
Relatos em inglês relatam que Said Sayyid bin Sultan al-Bu Said decidiu investir sua riqueza e energia neste projeto. Tal movimento precisava de coragem e fé, já que as plantas de cravo levam de sete a oito anos para atingir a maturidade e de oito a dez anos para a primeira safra. Brotamento não ocorre em períodos regulares e os próprios botões devem ser removidos antes da floração; A colheita é feita em três fases, entre agosto e dezembro. Isto, juntamente com a necessidade de cultivar as plantações constantemente, exigiu numerosos e qualificados trabalhadores, bem como as tropas Baloch que foram relatadas para patrulhar o mashamba do Sultão (BENNETT 1987: 28-29). A produção de cravos-da-índia era muito semelhante à das tâmaras e rapidamente captada pelos omanis, que passaram a adquirir terras em Zanzibar, principalmente às custas do suaíli. A expropriação legalizada praticada pelos omanis e uma interpretação um tanto questionável da instituição jurídica de usufruto muitas vezes levaram as terras swahili a serem confiscadas (COOPER, 1980).
O boom do cravo-da-índia, com seu alto lucro sobre o gasto inicial, provocou o surgimento de uma aristocracia proprietária de terras árabes de Omã, que foi financiada pelas comunidades mercantis indianas que lentamente substituíram a antiga aristocracia suaíli. O confisco das terras de suaíli mais férteis em Zanzibar e o influxo esmagador de escravos resultaram no número limitado de tribos nativas de Hadimu e Tumbatu na ilha sendo relegadas às margens da sociedade. Isto não causou grandes rupturas, graças à destreza dos investidores indianos, que gradualmente engajaram as elites locais da África Oriental delegando-lhes certas tarefas e responsabilidades e tornando-as participantes ativas neste importante negócio do Oceano Índico. Esses banyans indianos (mercadores) empregaram Baloch para defendê-los, exploraram famílias Swahili e financiaram os al-Bu Said bem como os comerciantes e expedições britânicos. Assim, durante o século XIX, eles se tornaram altamente influentes em Zanzibar (JAIN 1990: 71-105).
As plantações de cravo-da-índia seriam vitais para o crescimento econômico de Zanzibar, mas também minaram rapidamente a ordem tradicional e criaram o fenômeno conhecido como febre do cravo-da-índia. As vendas subiram fenomenalmente de 4.600 Maria Theresa thalers em 1834 para 25.000 em 1840 (SEMPLE 2005). Para os al-Bu Said na África, foi um triunfo. Mas de mãos dadas com o crescimento das plantações, houve uma demanda cada vez maior por escravos. Em 1811, dos 15.000 escravos que chegaram a Zanzibar, 7.000 foram destinados ao trabalho de parto no mashamba (BHACKER 1992: 128). A febre do cravo empurrou o número anual de novos escravos de 6 mil no início do século para 20 mil no segundo semestre.
A Grã-Bretanha via o cultivo e a exportação de produtos agrícolas tropicais com um olho extremamente favorável, na medida em que era uma alternativa econômica válida ao tráfico de escravos. O crescente número de plantações de cravo em Zanzibar também exigiu um aumento notável na força de trabalho. As altas taxas de mortalidade no mashamba significavam que quase toda a força de trabalho tinha que ser substituída a cada quatro anos, o que, como vimos, criava enormes problemas e mudanças de grande alcance na sociedade do Leste Africano. Além disso, os fluxos migratórios de árabes e asiáticos atraídos por esse mercado novo e lucrativo exacerbaram ainda mais a situação aos olhos dos ingleses.
As cidades-estados marítimos da costa suaíli sempre foram sustentadas pela interação íntima com os não-muçulmanos do interior rural, e isso contribuiu para a consolidação da identidade costeira (GLASSMAN, 1995, p. 33). Durante a primeira metade do século XIX, a demanda por marfim veio principalmente da Índia. Os árabes de Omã exploraram as antigas rotas de comércio de escravos para o interior, trazendo novas pessoas para a costa da África Oriental, juntamente com as presas de elefante. A região de Mrima foi a principal fonte de exportação de marfim para a economia de Zanzibar. Embora a agricultura tenha permanecido como sua principal fonte de riqueza, os árabes de Omã deram presentes de tecidos importados de suas maiores rotas comerciais do Oceano Índico, que envolviam os portos do oeste da Índia, para os principais chefes do interior. Tais mercadorias estrangeiras representavam um claro sinal de prestígio e superioridade dentro de suas tribos. O peixe salgado e defumado também se tornou um importante item comercial. As ilhas de Zanzibar e Pemba logo desenvolveram a produção de peixe para sustentar os carregadores ao longo das rotas de comércio para o interior e para usar na troca muito lucrativa de marfim. A demanda por copal também cresceu nesse período. Foi produzido na área de Bagamoyo e comprado pelos comerciantes indianos, junto com os postes de mangue, que foram levados para a Arábia e para o Golfo.
Enquanto as regiões costeiras foram transformadas pelo aumento da produção de commodities, as sociedades do interior experimentaram mudanças significativas devido ao massivo afluxo de escravos do interior e árabes e asiáticos do exterior. Por exemplo, a cidade de Tabora, um local chave na rota comercial para o coração do continente, praticamente se tornou uma cidade árabe, com uma considerável presença Baloch. Desenvolvimentos profundos ocorreram nas identidades culturais da costa e das ilhas, por um lado, e no interior do continente, por outro, onde, a partir dos anos 1830, novas rotas de caravanas levaram a uma verdadeira revolução econômica, social e termos culturais (BENJAMIN, 2006).
Havia vários conjuntos principais de rotas de comércio de escravo e marfim para o interior (veja o mapa na p. 338): 1) o & # 8220; southern & # 8221; rota de portos, como Kilwa, para o Lago Nyasa e as terras altas do interior do sudoeste, onde os carregadores de Nyamwezi pegaram suas cargas de presas e outros bens; 2) o & # 8220; central & # 8221; rota de marfim de Bagamoyo em direção ao oeste e noroeste, onde o comércio de caravanas foi progressivamente monopolizado pelos árabes de Omã e mercadores indianos; 3) o & # 8220; norte & # 8221; ou rota Masai, que levava de Mombasa e Malindi para o Kilimanjaro, onde os Mijikenda e Kamba eram caçadores de marfim. A rota da caravana Saadani para o leste do Zaire não desenvolveu uma comunidade comercial árabe, enquanto a rota Pangani levou à fundação de Ujiji por volta de 1840 e passou pelas colinas de Bondei e ao longo das montanhas Usambara e Pare. Este último era bem regado e preferido por viajantes de outras cidades do norte de Mrima. Grandes quantidades de marfim, pembe, de qualidade macia e alta, vieram de Pare e do vale Rift, e esta rota tornou-se a segunda em importância depois de Bagamoyo. A estação de comércio de Taveta na rota do norte nunca foi dominada pelos muçulmanos costeiros, já que era muito perigoso.
Another technology that was destined to profoundly change the balance of power in the hinterland was the gun. During the first half of the 19th century matchlocks began to appear in the hands of Baloch mercenary troops, who imported them from the Ottoman Empire and from Europe. Leading Swahili families, the Shirazi, gradually lost their power and were displaced by the Omani Arabs in the economy of Zanzibar.8 Although the Swahili retained control of the northern caravan trade, the great wealth soon passed into Arab and Indian hands. With the central route under the control of the al-Bu Sa’id, Tabora and Ujiji gradually became Arab dominated centres. Here Baloch soldiers settled, intermarried, and became powerful figures. The impact of Omani power in Zanzibar on the East African hinterland deeply influenced the lives and traditions of East African men and women. Power relations among traditional elites were modified considerably. Client-patronage relations were transformed, and new actors emerged. The ivory trade, especially during the second half of the 19th century, became a means of travel, adventure and wealth that offered a way to enhance one’s status within coastal communities. Everybody could share this ambition but new tensions grew between the rich Swahili families, who struggled to preserve their precarious domination, and the parvenus on whose support they relied.
While Britain continued on its anti-slavery crusade, motivated in part by the pragmatic aim of weakening the growing mercantile fortunes of Omani Arabs and other oriental leaders, France took advantage of the situation to recapture some of its standing in the region. Sa’id Sayyid bin Sultan al-Bu Sa’id did not hesitate either to double-cross. At the same time he reassured the English, he courted the French to support him against enemy Arab tribes (mazrui, pl. mazaria) on the islands of Mafia and Kilwa and in Mombasa. The Arabs in East Africa provided efficient support for the slave trade, and French merchants exploited this to the full. Under the Treaty of Paris in 1815, France regained sovereignty over the island of Bourbon (DE MARTENS 1818:682). The French explorer Charles Guillain noted the “rapports intimes qui continuaient d’exister entre l’Arabie et la côte orientale d’Afrique, oû nous savons que le commerce des esclaves avait lieu de temp immémorial” (GUILLAIN 1856:162). The Omani Sultan and France shared an interest in finding new ports and commercial bases. However, after taking the potential purchase of Zanzibar and Pemba into consideration, Paris instead turned its attention towards Madagascar. Given the unrivalled supremacy of the Royal Navy backed by the Bombay Marine (the fighting navy of the East India Company) in the western stretches of the Indian Ocean, and the defeats inflicted on the pirates of the Gulf, France was destined to play a secondary role in the Indian Ocean. In 1817, Lord Hastings, the Governor General of Bengal, proposed strengthening the Omani Sultan and supporting his power in East Africa. The Anglo-Indian government’s choice was influenced by continual pirate raids in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, the commercial and political instability that afflicted the entire region, and the presence of the French, who, despite their setbacks, continued to represent a threat to Great Britain.
On the one hand, British documents reveal that the political manoevres of Sa’id Sayyid bin Sultan al-Bu Sa’id were a cause for alarm: the British perceived him as an element of instability in a region that was the object of great interest and importance. On the other hand, Hastings’ decision represented a firm stance in favour of the Omani Sultan as a political point of reference for Britain, also in relation to those regions of East Africa in which the Omani Arab dynasty exercised an indirect form of control.
Though there is limited literature available to document it, slavery was practised in Balochistan in a similar pattern to that in Africa and Arabia. For example, in 1874 a group of Rinds from eastern Balochistan bought domestic slaves at Gwadar who came from the coasts of East Africa.9 This gave rise to a conflict of interests between the Rind and the representative (na’ib) of the Khan of Kalat in Kej, a conflict that ended in bloodshed and the death of four Rind tribesmen. Sir Robert Sandeman, at that time Deputy-Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, asserted that the death of these men had nothing to do with the slave trade at Gwadar. In 1877 Sandeman became agent to the Governor General and Chief Commissioner of Balochistan. He believed his political agents were not able to identify the real causes of tribal conflicts between groups in Balochistan. He remarked that “domestic slavery is a time-honoured institution in Balochistan as in other eastern countries, and much of the land is cultivated by slave labour … at the same time it must be remembered that many of the ideas attaching to the word “slavery”, which are so repellent to civilized minds, are absent from the manners of the Biluch tribes.”10.
This statement could be interpreted in different ways; for instance, it could be read as Eurocentrist and contemptuous of local populations. There were also geopolitical concerns that would have led Sandeman to justify slavery in Asia (SWIDLER 2003). These include the strategic importance of Balochistan within Anglo-Russian rivalry, the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), the construction of the Indo-European Telegraph Line that connected Calcutta to London, the long-term political consequences of the Great Mutiny in India of 1857, and the growing importance of the North West Frontier of British India. Also significant at the time was the push to define the borders between Persia and the Khanate of Kalat which started with the commission directed by Sir Frederic Goldsmid in 1870 and ended with the signing of an Agreement in Teheran on September 24th, 1872 (PIACENTINI 1991:189-203, BROBST 1977). During the first years of the 20th century, the British adopted measures against the slave trade that contributed to the reduction of the number of slaves coming to India from East Africa. This reduction corresponded to a new slave trade, a “horizontal slave route”, from the coast of Balochistan to the main suqs of Arabia (see fn. 6). British observers in Makran linked the rise of slavery there with the restriction of the trade elsewhere. “The reason there is such a demand for slaves from these parts, is that the trade from the African Coast has been effectually stopped, and Balochistan is the only place now open to them.”11 The poorest among the Baloch were sold as slaves. They were collected within the district of Kej and sent as slaves to Persian territory as well as to Arabia.12 This is shown by a telegram that the assistant superintendent in the Jask area sent to the to the director of the Persian Gulf section in Karachi on 20 May 1903: “a great number of them are brought to these places from the Kej district … not only Africans but low caste Balochis are now being sold by petty headmen.” Baloch slave women had their heads totally shaved, then covered with quicklime, so that their hair could not regrow, This rendered them easily recognizable and prevented them from returning to their own tribes and villages.13.
To conclude, Baloch were active in the supply of slaves from both Africa and Asia. First as mercenary troops and later as traders, they took part in the slave trade in sub - Saharan East Africa that was generally controlled by Omani-Arabs. But Baloch were engaged in the slave trade in their homeland. This trade included Africans who worked as domestic and agricultural slaves in Balochistan. However, there is also the factor of the enslavement of Baloch by rival tribesmen and more powerful ethnic groups.
A. G.G. Agent to the Governor-General H. S.A. Home Secretariate Archives (Quetta, Pakistan)
1 I wish to thank Professor William Gervase Clarence-Smith (SOAS, University of London) for his sharp comments. I am also grateful to Ms. Ann Griffin (British Library) for her efficient help. 328 Beatrice Nicolini.
2 Starting from the first half of the 19th century the banning of slavery on the western coasts of Africa affected the slave trade along East Africa, which grew during the second half of the 19th century, despite abolition treaties. On the effects of the banning of slavery in West Africa on East Africa see for example FAGE 2002, LOVEJOY 1997, 2000:226-252.
3 The word is a borrowing from French champ “field”.
4 See CLARENCE-SMITH 1989, MARTIN/RYAN 1977, ALPERS 1967, 1975, GRAY/BIRMINGHAM 1970, MANNING 1990.
330 Beatrice Nicolini.
5 Among the incidents the al-Bu Sa’id had to deal with were two attacks on Sur and Gwadar in 1805 by Shaikh Sultan, the leader of the Qasimi tribe of Ras al-Khaimah. The Omani fleet immediately retook the centres after they were seized.
332 Beatrice Nicolini.
6 H. S.A. – A. G.G. Office – Essential Records, Balochistan Archives: Complaint about existence of Slavery in Balochistan, from Capt. P. Cox, Consul and Political Agent, Maskat to Lieut. Col. C. A. Kemball, Agg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 17th September, 1901. Political, 5-2/57. See also MIERS 2003:306-309. 334 Beatrice Nicolini.
7 The importance of porters for the African economy is also due to difficulties with the use of animals, which were liable to getting sleeping sickness (ROCKEL 1997:2).
8 Persian settlements on the east coast of Africa trace their origins to the legend of the seven Persian Princes. Ali, of Abyssinian mother and a Persian father named Hussein, had seven brothers from Shiraz, who sailed to Africa with seven ships and touched at seven different ports where they founded Persian “reigns” from Mombasa to Kilwa. Persian origins, i. e., Shirazi, soon became an ethnic and political identity within the history of Swahili civilization, and today in Zanzibar nauruz, the Zoroastrian new year (mwaka kogwa, which translates as “year washed / bathed”), is regularly celebrated (cf. NICOLINI 2004:62-63, MIDDLETON 1992:101, CHITTICK 1965).
9 The history of slavery in Balochistan, and its connections with East Africa is an open topic as available literature is limited. Some documents in the archives of the district commissioner in Quetta are preserved in a very poor state.
10 H. S.A. – A. G.G. Office – Essential Records, Balochistan Archives: From the A. G.G. to the Secretary to the Government of India. Foreign Department, Quetta, 25 March, 1884, Report n. 942.
AGIUS, Dionisius 2002: In the Wake of the Dow. The Arabian Gulf and Oman. Reading: Ithaca Press.
––– 2005: Seafaring in the Arabian Gulf and Oman. The People of the Dhow. London: Kegan.
11 H. S.A. – A. G.G. Office Confidential, 1903-1905, File 23, n. 1510: Traffic in Slaves from Kej to.
Persia, from the Ass. Superintendent Jask Sub-Division to the Director, Persian Gulf Section,
Karachi, Extract of a Letter n. 11 dated 28th March, 1904.
12 H. S.A. – A. G.G. Office Confidential, 1903-1905, File 23, n. 1510: Traffic in Slaves from Kej to.
Persia, from Russell, Under Secr. to the Gov. of India to the A. G.G. Quetta, 1903.
13 H. S.A. – A. G.G. Office Confidential, 1903-1905, File 23, n. 1510: Traffic in Slaves from Kej to.
Persia, from the Ass. Superintendent Jask Sub-Division to the Director, Persian Gulf Section,
Karachi, Telegram dated 20th May, 1903.
342 Beatrice Nicolini.
ALPERS, Edward 1967: The East African Slave Trade [Historical Association of Tanzania paper.
3]. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
––– 1975: Ivory and Slaves. Changing Patterns of International Trade in East Central Africa.
to the later Nineteenth century. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
BARENDSE, Rene 2001: The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century.
New York: East Gate Book, M. E. Sharp.
BENJAMIN, Jesse 2006: “Squatters, Resistance to ‘Development’ and Magic as a Tool of.
subaltern power: A Case from Coastal Kenya”. In: Beatrice NICOLINI (ed.): Studies in.
Witchcraft, Magic, War and Peace in Africa, XIX and XX Centuries. Lampeter: E. Mellen.
Press, pp. 239-262.
BENNETT, Norman 1987: A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar [Studies in East African.
History]. London: Methuen.
BHACKER, M. Reda 1992: Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar: Roots of British.
Domination. London: Routledge.
BROBST, Peter 1977: “Sir Frederic Goldsmid and the Containment of Persia, 1863-73”. In:
Middle Eastern Studies 33/2, pp. 197-215.
CHITTICK, N. H. 1965: “The ‘Shirazi’ Colonization of East Africa”. In: Journal of African.
History 6, pp. 275-294.
CLARENCE-SMITH, William G. 1989: “The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade in the.
Nineteenth Century: An Overview”. In: William CLARENCE-SMITH (ed.): The Economics of.
the Indian Ocean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century. London: F. Cass, pp. 1-21.
––– 2006: Islam and the Abolition of Slavery. New York: Oxford University Press.
COOPER, Frederick 1980: From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in.
Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890-1925. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
DAVIES, Charles 1997: The Blood-Red Arab Flag. An Investigation into Qasimi Piracy 1797-
1820. Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
FAGE, John 2002: A History of Africa. London: Routledge, 4th ed.
FURLONGE, Nigel 1999: “Revisiting the Zanj and Re-Visioning Revolt: Complexities of the Zanj.
Conflict (868-883 AD) – slave revolt in Iraq”. In: Negro History Bulletin 62, pp. 1-7.
GILBERT, Erik 2004: Dhows and the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar 1860-1970. Oxford: J.
GLASSMAN, Jonathon 1991: “The Bondsman’s new clothes: the contradictory consciousness of.
slave resistance on the Swahili Coast”. In: Journal of African History 32, pp. 277-312.
––– 1995: Feasts and Riot, Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili.
Coast, 1856-1888. London: J. Currey.
GRAY, Richard, and David BIRMINGHAM (eds.) 1970: Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on.
Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900. London: Oxford University Press.
GUILLAIN, Charles 1856: Documents sur l’Histoire, La Geographie et le Commerce de l’Afrique.
Orientale. Paris: Bertrand, 3 vols.
The 19th Century Slave Trade in the Western Indian Ocean 343.
HEUMAN, Gad 1999: “Slavery: The Slave Trade, and Abolition”. In: Robin WINKS (ed.):
Historiography, The Oxford History of the British Empire V. Oxford: Oxford University.
Press, pp. 315-327.
HOURANI, George F. 1995: Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and early Medieval.
Vezes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2nd ed.
JAIN, Vardhaman 1990: Trade and Traders in Western India. New Dehli: Mumshiram.
LODHI, Abdulaziz 2000: Oriental Influences in Swahili. A Study in Language and Culture.
Contatos. Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.
LOVEJOY, Paul 1997: “The African Diaspora: Revisionist Interpretations of Ethnicity, Culture.
and Religion under Slavery”. In: Studies in the World History of Slavery, Abolition and.
Emancipation II/1, pp. 1-23.
––– 2000: Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge.
University Press, 2nd ed.
MACHADO, Pedro 2005: Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks in Mozambique, 1777-c.1830.
London: University of London (PhD thesis)
MANNING, Patrick 1990: Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental and African Slave.
Traders [African Studies Series]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MARKOVITS, Claude 2000: The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947: Traders of Sind.
from Bukhara to Panama. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DE MARTENS, George 1818: Nouveau Recueil de Traités de l’Europe, Traité de Paix du 20 Nov.
1815 avec les Conventions Speciales II: 1814-15. Göttingen: Dieterich.
MARTIN, Esmond, and T. C.I. RYAN 1977: “A Quantitative Assessment of the Arab Slave Trade.
of East Africa, 1770-1896”. In: Kenya Historical Review 5, pp. 71-91.
MIDDLETON, J. 1992: The World of the Swahili. An African Mercantile Civilization. Novo.
Haven: Yale University Press.
MIERS, Suzanne 2003: Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The evolution of a global problem.
Walnut Creek etc.: Alta Mira Press.
MILES, Samuel 1984: “Notes on the Tribes of ‘Oman by L. C.S. B. Miles, 27 May 1881”. In:
[Sir ˙h¯an Ibn-Sa’¯ıd Ibn-SIR ˙ HA¯ N (ed.): Annals of Oman to 1728]. Cambridge: Oleander Press,
NICOLINI, Beatrice 2002: “Historical and Political Links between Gwadar and Muscat through.
Nineteenth Century’s Testimonies”. In: Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies.
(PSAS), London 32, pp. 281-286.
––– 2004: Makran, Oman and Zanzibar: Three-Terminal Cultural Corridor in the Western.
Indian Ocean (1799-1856). Leiden: Brill.
PÉTRÉ-GRENOUILLEAU, Olivier 2004: Les traites négrières: essai d’histore globale. Paris:
344 Beatrice Nicolini.
PIACENTINI, Valeria 1991: “Notes on the Definition of the Western Borders of British India in.
Sistan and Balochistan in the 19th century”. In: Biancamaria SCARCIA AMORETTI (ed.):
Y¯ad-n¯ama. In memoria di Alessandro Bausani I. Roma: Bardi, pp. 189-203.
POPOVIC, Alexander 1999: Revolt of African Slaves in Iraq in the 3rd/9th century. Berlin: M.
POWELS, Randall 2000: “The East African Coast, c. 780 to 1900 C. E.”. In: Nehemia LEVTZION.
(ed.): The History of Islam in Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press, pp. 251-271.
PRESTHOLDT, Jeremy 2004: “On the Global Repercussions of East African Consumerism”. In:
The American Historical Review 109, pp. 755-781.
REDAELLI, Riccardo 2003: “The Environmental Human Landscape”. In: V. PIACENTINI FIORANI,
Riccardo REDAELLI (eds.): Balochistan: Terra Incognita. A new methodological approach.
combining archaeological, historical, anthropological and architectural studies [British.
Archaeological Reports]. Oxford: Archaeopress, pp. 17-32.
ROCKEL, Stephen 1997: Caravan Porters of the Nyika. Labour, Culture, and Society in.
nineteenth Century Tanzania. PhD thesis, University of Toronto.
––– 2000: “‘A Nation of Porters’: The Nyamwezy and the Labour Market in Nineteenth-
Century Tanzania”. In: Journal of African History 41, pp. 173-195.
SEMPLE, Clara 2005: Silver Legend, The Story of the Maria Theresa Thaler [Barzan Studies in.
Arabian Culture 1]. Manchester: Barzan Publishing.
SHERIFF, Abdul 1987: Slaves, Spices & Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African.
Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770-1873. Athens: Ohio University Press.
––– 2005: “The Twilight of Slavery in the Persian Gulf”. In: A. SHERIFF (ed.): ZIFF Journal.
Monsoons and Migrations 2. Zanzibar: Zanzibar International Film Festival, pp. 35-45.
SWIDLER, Nina 2003: “On the Difficulty of Telling a Slave from a Wife”. In: Carina JAHANI,
Agnes KORN (eds.): The Baloch and Their Neighbours: Ethnic and Linguistic Contact in.
Balochistan in Historical and Modern Times. Wiesbaden: Reichert, pp. 343-356.
SYKES, Percy 1902: Ten Thousands Miles in Persia. New York and London: C. Scribner’s Sons.
YLVISAKER, Marguerite 1982: “The Ivory Trade in the Lamu Area 1600-1870”. In: J. De V.
ALLEN and Thomas H. WILSON (eds.): From Zinj to Zanzibar: Studies in history, trade and.
society on the Eastern Coast of Africa; in honour of James Kirkman on the occasion of his.
seventy-fifth birthday [Paideuma 28]. Wiesbaden: Steiner, pp. 221-231.
Carina JAHANI, Agnes KORN, Paul TITUS (eds.) 2008:
The Baloch and Others: Linguistic, historical and socio-political perspectives on.
pluralism in Balochistan. Wiesbaden, Reichert, pp. 327-344.

Din Merican: o blogueiro malaio DJ.
& # 8230; melhor seguir a verdadeira verdade das coisas & quot; Maquiavel.
The Emerging Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region.
The Emerging Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region.
By Jonathan D. T. Ward.
In a world in which Asia plays an increasingly important economic and geopolitical role, the Indian Ocean provides the foundation for the trading systems that underpin Asia’s economic rise. The Indian Ocean is the basin in which trade from Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa connects. It is also the energy lifeline on which several of the world’s major economies depend. Littered with maritime chokepoints, the geopolitical outcomes that will determine the region’s future have yet to be decided.
Three essential pieces are visible in the geopolitics and economics of the Indian Ocean Region.
First, the Chinese economy depends on access to this region. Energy imports from the Middle East, resources from Africa, and trade with Europe must transit the Indian Ocean in order to reach China. To make things more difficult, Indian Ocean shipping towards China must pass through the two-mile-wide Strait of Malacca. Former PRC Chairman Hu Jintao termed this chokepoint ‘the Malacca Dilemma’, both because of the difficulty of transiting trade back to China through this narrow waterway, and also because of its vulnerability to blockade or maritime interdiction. As such, China must deal with a very difficult geography in the region which it depends on for economic survival and growth.
Second, the region is home to a rising India which possesses much more advantageous geography than China does when it comes to maritime trade and security. As China builds up its expeditionary naval forces to embark on a ‘two-ocean strategy’ that focuses on the Pacific and Indian Ocean, India, in its most recent maritime strategy, made clear that it considers the Indian Ocean, from the Cape of Good Hope to the Lombok Straits, as its primary area of interest. The Indian Navy plans to field three aircraft carrier groups, one which will patrol the Eastern Indian Ocean, a second for the Western Indian Ocean, and a third to be held in reserve. Chinese naval visits to Indian Ocean nations such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan, two essential nodes on China’s ‘Maritime Silk Road’, have led to discomfort in New Delhi.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Chinese President Xi Jinping –Indian Ocean Diplomacy.
Third, while the Indian Ocean is increasingly the realm in which the geopolitics of China-India relations will take shape in the coming decades, many other nations are also dependent on its waterways for commerce, and it is increasingly becoming a feature in national strategy documents, where the ‘Asia-Pacific’ often becomes the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as nations measure their global and regional strategic interests. If the Pacific links the Americas to Asia, the Indian Ocean links East, South, Southeast, and West Asia, as well linking Asia to Africa and Europe. It is the waterway that makes an Asian trading system possible, and with it the possibility of a world with Asia increasingly at its economic center. As such, while access to the Indian Ocean is essential to many, domination of the Indian Ocean by any single power is likely to be resisted.
In this vital region, initiatives that attempt to secure access and influence are already underway. China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, half of which is focused on Indian Ocean trade routes from China to Africa to Europe, aims to build infrastructure that will link these other continents more tightly with China. While ‘OBOR’ is marketed as an economic project, key places on the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ have also been used for military purposes. China’s most recent defense strategy emphasizes that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) must ‘safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests’, as well as tasking the PLA Navy to ‘shift its focus from “offshore waters defense” to the combination of “offshore waters defense” with “open seas protection”. In addition to building military infrastructure in the South China Sea, China has begun construction of its first overseas military base in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, at the opposite end of Indian Ocean sea lines of communication that are vital to China. In addition to visits by Chinese naval assets to the East African coast during anti-piracy operations, underway since 2008, Chinese submarines docked in Pakistan in 2015, and in Sri Lanka in 2014, at a Chinese owned terminal in the port of Colombo. This month, three Chinese warships arrived in Pakistan where a joint naval exercise is scheduled. A Chinese naval officer said of prior exercises with Pakistan in November, 2016 that they would ‘improve the naval capability of both countries to protect Gwadar port activities’ & # 8211; Pakistan’s Gwadar is a hub on OBOR’s ‘Maritime Silk Road’.
Chinese investment in Indian Ocean countries has been rising, leading to concerns over indebtedness to China by smaller Indian Ocean states including Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Djibouti. The possibility of an Indian Ocean Rim constructed of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) beholden to China should not be overlooked as the geopolitical future of this vital region takes shape.
The military dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region are evolving rapidly, particularly as China and India build up expeditionary naval forces, and each one supplies partner nations with military material. China has agreed to provide Pakistan with eight diesel-electric submarines, exercising with Pakistan’s navy last year in the East China Sea, and this month in the Indian Ocean. India has upgraded its relationship with Vietnam to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership,’ and has found substantial partners in the United States and Japan. Meanwhile, India has extended its naval relationships across the Indo-Pacific, inaugurating bilateral naval exercises with Japan, Australia, and Indonesia.
If there is a great game in the Indian Ocean, it may be a game of economics, infrastructure, and investment. At present, however, there are few players that can rival China’s influence and impact, particularly as OBOR gains ground in both developing and advanced economies around the world. India has not yet reached an economic position in which large levels of outbound investment can garner influence in other nations, and the Modi government is currently busy building much needed domestic port and infrastructure projects under the Sagarmala program.
The Asian Development Bank estimates that Asia has $26 trillion in infrastructure needs from 2016 to 2030, and HSBC estimates Asia’s needs at $11.5 trillion over the same period. Both numbers are well outside the scope of new Chinese initiatives including OBOR, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), or the OBOR-focused Silk Road Fund. However, the Indian Ocean Region – which comprises East Africa, the Red Sea and Suez, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, South East Asia, and Australia – is rarely studied as an economic region unto itself. Data from AEI’s China Global Investment Tracker shows that China invested nearly $500 billion in the region from 2005-2016, more than double its investments in Europe or East Asia and triple its investments in the United States in the same period. As the vital interests of major Asian nations are increasingly linked to this ocean, and as a contest for security and assured access is likely to continue, we can expect many players, near and far, to realize the importance of this ocean to a world system in which Asia plays a major role, and, accordingly, to turn attention to the shape that this region will take in the coming decades.
Dr. Jonathan Ward has recently completed his Ph. D. at the University of Oxford, specializing in China-India relations. He is the founder of the recently established Atlas Organization, a consultancy which advises on China, India, and their strategic interests. He can be contacted at Ward@AtlasOrganization.
The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue.
Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options.
The Asia Pacific Bulletin (APB) series is produced by the East-West Center in Washington.
APB Series Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye, Director, East-West Center in Washington.
APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente, Project Assistant, East-West Center in Washington.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization with which the author is affiliated.
For comments/responses on APB issues or article submissions, please contact washington@eastwestcenter.
East-West Center | 1601 East-West Road | Honolulu, HI | 808.944.7111.
East-West Center in Washington | 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 600 | Washington, DC | 202.293.3995.
Pós-navegação.
6 pensamentos sobre & ldquo; The Emerging Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region ”
Is this a tactical or strategic analysis or wish list? Sometimes PhD’s are not what it makes for the possessor to be ‘conscious’, but only seemingly intelligent.
Plunked in the middle of the Indian Ocean are a coupla minute islands in the Chagos Archipelago, one of which is called Diego Garcia. Wonder who occupies it? Whoever it is – will be the Taikor.
Then, on the Eastern arc of IO lies Indonesia and Oz. I wonder whether the author was aware that OBOR (Malay for ‘Torch’) is a dirty word to them. Or they don’t count at all and are ‘submergent’?
India has always accused China of establishing the “string of pearls” in the Indian Ocean to encircle India. The phrase ‘String of Pearls’ was first used in 2005, in a report entitled “Energy Futures in Asia” provided to US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. It alleged that China was adopting a “string of pearls” strategy of bases stretching from the Middle East to southern China. These “pearls” were naval bases or electronic eavesdropping posts built by the Chinese in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The purpose was to project its power overseas and protect its oil shipments.
Access, rather than bases, is what the Chinese Navy is really interested in the Indian Ocean. China has only two purposes in the Indian Ocean: economic gains and the security of Sea lines of Communication (SLOC). The first objective is achieved through commercial interactions with littoral states. For the second purpose, the Chinese Navy has, since the end of 2008, joined international military efforts in combating piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia. In fact, the only thing justifiable in the “string of pearls” theory is that it underlines the growing importance of the Indian Ocean for China’s ever-expanding national interests, especially in terms of energy import. China is now securing its energy needs from all parts of the world, but the Middle East still prevails as the most important source. By the end of 2013, China had become the largest trader and the largest oil importer in the world. The Indian Ocean, and hence the security of SLOCs from Bab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz, to the Malacca Strait, is thus vitally important for China.
Two countries are most important for China’s freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean: India and the US. India is a wannabe superpower behaving like they’re already a superpower. The US is the only country that has the full capabilities to control the chokepoints in the Indian Ocean and cut off the SLOCs all the way to China, but it is unlikely to exercise such capabilities, unless, perhaps, in an all-out war with China. Even during the Cold War neither the US nor the Soviet Union endeavored to cut off any SLOCs in the world. Besides, the SLOCs are life-lines for all states. Cutting off China’s SLOCs will also affect US allies of Japan, ROK and Australia. So long as Sino-American relations remain manageable, such a worst-case scenario is unlikely to occur.
The rivalry between India and China is often hyped, mainly by the paranoia Indian “strategists”, but Indian government thus far would not challenge China unnecessarily. There’s no dispute between China and India in the Indian Ocean. The Line of Actual Control along the Sino-Indian border has by and large remained peaceful. Although there were a few standoffs, not a single bullet was fired across the border in over fifty years. The queer idea of China encircling India from the sea with the help of Pakistan only exists in the wildest imagination of some Indian “strategists”. This shows how much these so-called strategists fear China and hate Pakistan.
For those who are interested to read queer and delusional theories by these Indian “strategists”, just check into Eurasia Review, which has become an outlet for Indian “scholars” to bash China and Pakistan. Check into any Indian news media online and you can read the same thing, almost daily. India is playing a dangerous game.
Having been to the urban and rural hearts of both these giants, i find India confusing, filthy, authentic, generally poor, chaotic and yet utterly fascinating. PRC’s predictable, artificial, competitive, busy and yet utterly boring. Is there something wrong with me?
You need to ask? Everyone knows you disdain anything and everything Chinese. RI MUITO.
Very well compiled. Also, please check out this satirical take on how Indians are stereotyped abroad: columntribe. wordpress/2017/07/24/no-mr-amitabh-bachchan-is-not-my-neighbor/
Olá admin, devo dizer que você tem artigos de alta qualidade aqui.
Seu site deve se tornar viral. You need initial traffic boost only.
Como conseguir isso? Search for: Mertiso’s tips go viral.

Indian ocean maritime trade system

THE INDIAN OCEAN.
Oceans of the World, navigation and safety at sea and conservation of marine species.
The Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world's oceanic divisions, covering approximately 20% of the water on the Earth's surface. It is bounded by Asia - including India, after which the ocean is named - on the north, on the west by Africa, on the east by Australia, and on the south by the Southern Ocean (or, depending on definition, by Antarctica.)
The Port of Singapore is the busiest port in the Indian Ocean, located in Strait of Malacca where it meets the Pacific. Mumbai Port is the chief trading port in India on the coast of the Indian Ocean, often known as "The Gateway of India". A new port has been developed near Mumbai known as the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) or more popularly known as Nhava Sheva to reduce the burden on Mumbai. It is amongst world's top 10 fastest growing ports.
Mormugao Port and Panambur (New Mangalore Port) handle most of the Iron Ore export from India especially to Japan. Kochi is another major Indian port on the Arabian Sea. It is a deep natural harbour and is known as "The Queen of the Arabian Sea". Other major South Asian ports include Chittagong in Bangladesh, Colombo, Hambantota and Galle in Sri Lanka, Kolkata, Visakhapatnam, Paradip Port, Chennai, Ennore, Tuticorin, and Nagapattinam in India, and Karachi in Pakistan. Aden is a major port in Yemen and controls ships entering the Red Sea.
Major African ports on the shores of the Indian Ocean include: Mombasa (Kenya), Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar (Tanzania), Durban, East London, Richard's Bay (South Africa), Beira (Mozambique), and Port Louis (Mauritius). Zanzibar is especially famous for its spice export. Other major ports in the Indian Ocean include Muscat (Oman), Yangon (Burma), Jakarta, Medan (Indonesia) and Perth (Australia), Dubai (UAE).
The African, Indian, and Antarctic crustal plates converge in the Indian Ocean at the Rodrigues Triple Point. Their junctures are marked by branches of the mid-oceanic ridge forming an inverted Y, with the stem running south from the edge of the continental shelf near Mumbai, India. The eastern, western, and southern basins thus formed are subdivided into smaller basins by ridges.
The ocean's continental shelves are narrow, averaging 200 kilometres (125 mi) in width. An exception is found off Australia's western coast, where the shelf width exceeds 1,000 kilometres (600 mi). The average depth of the ocean is 3,890 m (12,762 ft). Its deepest point is Diamantina Deep in Diamantina Trench, at 8,047 m (26,401 ft) deep; also sometimes considered is Sunda Trench, at a depth of 7,258–7,725 m (23,812–25,344 ft). North of 50° south latitude, 86% of the main basin is covered by pelagic sediments, of which more than half is globigerina ooze. The remaining 14% is layered with terrigenous sediments. Glacial outwash dominates the extreme southern latitudes.
INDIAN OCEAN CLEANUP PROPOSALS.
We have been contacted by a number of organizations with a view to cleaning up the Ganges, when we have explained that our RiverVax concept is not at an advanced enough stage that we feel we could offer these craft for sale with a definite delivery date. We have also been contacted by a humanitarian group (June 2016) seeking proposals to clean up the Indian Ocean and another organization wanting to focus on the Maldives group of Islands in relation to plastic pollution and processing.
While we are presently crowd funded to help us reach Phase II of our SeaVax development project, the sums we have been granted will not allow us to accelerate development such that a full size vessel will be in the water by 2018. It would take something like Ј7 million pounds to make this a reality much before this, aiming for a late 2017 launch - and to achieve that we would need to employ subcontractors to produce component parts to our design. Whereas, at the moment, doing virtually everything in-house, we need only to raise sums in the region of Ј2 million pounds to see us through 2017 with further cash injections as may be identified to overcome specific issues as yet unknown. The lower investment scale of development is likely to mean a 2018 or 2019 launch.
Potential investors, whether crowd fund contributors or responsible corporations, should also bear in mind that should an operation commence to clean up the Indian Ocean, that currents from the Atlantic and Pacific oceans will both invade and benefit from efforts aimed at the Indian Ocean. We can though suggest a plan to benefit this locality specifically should any government or organization be interested.
Where we do not benefit from (nor qualify for) European grants such as Horizon 2020, should the United Kingdom leave the European Union, our status will not be affected, save only where exchange rates may put us at a disadvantage in purchasing materials and components overseas.
Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a threat to international shipping since the second phase of the Somali Civil War in the early 21st century. Since 2005, many international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization and the World Food Programme, have expressed concern over the rise in acts of piracy. Piracy has impeded the delivery of shipments and increased shipping expenses, costing an estimated $6.6 to $6.9 billion a year in global trade according to Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP). According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), a veritable industry of profiteers has also risen around the piracy. Insurance companies, in particular, have profited from the pirate attacks, as insurance premiums have increased significantly.
TABLE OF PIRACY EVENTS.
Somali pirates have attacked hundreds of vessels in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean region, though most attacks do not result in a successful hijacking. In 2008, there were 111 attacks which included 42 successful hijackings. However, this is only a fraction of the up to 30,000 merchant vessels which pass through that area. The rate of attacks in January and February 2009 was about 10 times higher than during the same period in 2008 and "there have been almost daily attacks in March", with 79 attacks, 21 successful, by mid April. Most of these attacks occur in the Gulf of Aden but the Somali pirates have been increasing their range and have started attacking ships as far south as off the coast of Kenya in the Indian Ocean. Below are some notable pirate events which have garnered significant media coverage since 2007.
In November 2008, Somali pirates began hijacking ships well outside the Gulf of Aden, perhaps targeting ships headed for the port of Mombasa, Kenya. The frequency and sophistication of the attacks also increased around this time, as did the size of vessels being targeted. Large cargo ships, oil and chemical tankers on international voyages became the new targets of choice for the Somali hijackers. This is in stark contrast to the pirate attacks which were once frequent in the Strait of Malacca, another strategically important waterway for international trade, which were according to maritime security expert Catherine Zara Raymond, generally directed against "smaller, more vulnerable vessels carrying trade across the Straits or employed in the coastal trade on either side of the Straits."
THE INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION.
The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) is an intergovernmental organization that was created in 1982 at Port Louis, Mauritius and institutionalized in 1984 by the Victoria Agreement in Seychelles. The IOC is composed of five African Indian Ocean nations: Comoros, Rйunion (a department of France), Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. Notwithstanding their different characteristics (Reunion as a French department; Mauritius and Seychelles as Middle-Income Countries whereas Comoros and Madagascar are amongst the Least-Developed Countries), the five islands share geographic proximity, historical and demographic relationships, natural resources and common development issues.
MISS INDIA - has been participating in the Miss Universe pageant since 1952, starting with Indrani Rehman and in the Miss World pageant since 1959, starting with Fleur Ezekiel. Historically, the Femina Miss India pageant sent the winner of the pageant to the Miss Universe pageant and a runner up to Miss Asia Pacific pageant and on some occasions the 2nd runner up used to represent India at International Teen Princess contest, whereas Eve's Weekly, a rival women's publication sent the winner of its Miss India contest to Miss World and Miss International.
In the 1970s, Femina acquired the rights to send a representative to Miss World as well, and started to send the winner to Miss Universe and the runner-up to the Miss World contest. Later in 1991, Femina Miss India also acquired the rights to send India's representatives to Miss International pageant. In 1994, following India's historic dual wins at both Miss Universe and Miss World, the custom of crowning a single winner was discontinued. Instead, the top three placers were designated a winners with equal visibility, equal prizes and responsibilities, and were crowned as Femina Miss India-Universe, Femina Miss India-World, and Femina Miss India-International or on some occasions the third winner represented India at Miss Asia Pacific and was crowned as Femina Miss India-Asia Pacific and a finalist was sent to Miss International.
In 2002, the third title was changed to Femina Miss India-Earth, to designate India's representation at the newly launched Miss Earth pageant, focused on the cause of environmental advocacy and a finalist was sent to Miss International. From 2007 to 2009, three equal winners were selected going to Miss Universe, Miss World, and Miss Earth. In 2010, Femina Miss India decided to stop sending representatives to the Miss Universe pageant entirely, choosing instead to send a crowned winner to Miss International.
Miss India or Femina Miss India is a national beauty pageant in India that annually selects representatives to compete in Miss World and other international pageants. It is organised by Femina, a women's magazine published by Bennett, Coleman & Co. Ltd (also known as The Times Group). The reigning Femina Miss India winners are Aditi Arya, Aafreen Vaz and Vartika Singh. Many such contests are now used to highlight ocean pollution issues.
Oil and plastic pollution totaling some eight million tons of waste in five major ocean gyres, is killing life in the oceans and poisoning our food chain. Dolphins, Seals and Turtles that have been trapped by plastic bags, nets and the like are common sights. These animals cannot clean the oceans up themselves. They need the help of the humans that caused the problem, turning their habitat into a convenient 'out of sight' rubbish dump.
Adapted Bluefish ZCC semi-autonomous drones could clean up the oceans for us in just a decade, if funding can be sourced to kickstart such a challenging project. Bluebird Marine Systems are not fund raising for the proposed clean-up project, rather leaving this to those better qualified. BMS are though able to develop prototypes in-house to be able to prove concepts, and arrange for subcontractors to build ocean going SeaVax cleaners that do not add to the carnage, because they are themselves zero emission, solar and wind powered high performance vehicles. We are prepared to work on research projects such as these on a not-for-profit basis in collaboration with other agencies and organizations .
The Indian Ocean - Paradise Island.
MARILAO - MEKONG - MISSISSIPPI - NIGER - NILE - PARANA - PASIG - SARNO - THAMES - YANGTZE - YAMUNA - YELLOW.
Map of the Ganges/Brahmaputra basin, a massive complex of rivers that drain India and Bangladesh surface water into the Bay of Bengal, unfortunately, transporting millions of gallons of toxic waste into the Indian Ocean. Innovate are co-hosting a call for collaborative research between India and the UK, to include clean-tech, potentially useful for local authorities in India looking to clean up the Ganges.
SEAVOLUTION - The key to accurate hydrographic mapping is continuous monitoring, for which the SeaVax platform, presently under development, is a robotic ocean workhorse. Based on a stable trimaran configuration this design is under development in the UK for international deployment. A robot ship uses no diesel fuel to monitor rivers and oceans autonomously (COLREGS compliant) 24/7 and 365 days a year - only possible with the revolutionary (patent) energy harvesting system.
CLEANER OCEANS - Taking the ZCC concept further, the robot boat above is a feasibility design for cleaning up ocean plastic waste, and turning it into MARPOL compliant bunker fuel. Plastic waste in the Indian Ocean is at an all time high, with studies revealing that the at present 8 million tons rotating in 6 gyres is likely to double in the next 10 years if nothing is done about it. Cleaner oceans mean healthier fish. We need sustainable blue growth to ensure the quality of food for a growing human population. Let us know of your thoughts on this subject. Do you want to see cleaner oceans? And how might you be able to help us bring that about?
This website is Copyright © 2017 Bluebird Marine Systems Limited. The names Bluebird™ , Bluefish™, Miss Ocean™, RiverVax™, SeaNet™, SeaVax™ and the blue bird in flight logo are trademarks. All other trademarks are hereby acknowledged.

China develops underwater surveillance networks in Indian Ocean, South China Sea.
China develops underwater surveillance networks in Indian Ocean, South China Sea.
A naval submarine on patrol off the coast of Visakhapatnam. (File photo for representational purpose) | Photo Credit: K. R. Deepak.
China has developed a new underwater surveillance network to help its submarines get a stronger lock on targets while protecting the nation’s interests along the maritime Silk Road, which includes the Indian Ocean, a media report said today.
The system, which has already been launched, works by gathering information about the underwater environment, particularly water temperature and salinity, which the navy can then use to more accurately track target vessels as well as improve navigation and positioning, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported.
The project, led by the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology under the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), is part of an unprecedented military expansion fuelled by Beijing’s desire to challenge the United States in the world’s oceans, the Post said.
After years of construction and testing, the new surveillance system was now in the hands of the navy, which reported “good results”, the oceanology institute said in latest briefing in November, according to the report.
But China still has some way to go before it can compete with the world’s only true superpower, it said.
The Chinese system is based on a network of platforms — buoys, surface vessels, satellites and underwater gliders — that gather data from the South China Sea, and the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, the paper quoted the report by Oceanology Institute.
That information is then streamed to three intelligence centres — in the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, the southern province of Guangdong, and a joint facility in South Asia — where it is processed and analysed, it said.
In recent years, China has stepped up naval expeditions to the Indian Ocean to fight the pirates in the Gulf of Aden.
These expeditions included large naval ships accompanied by submarines. China is silent about the reasons to deploy submarines for anti-piracy operations.
China is also seeking to establish logistic bases in the Indian Ocean, much to the chagrin of India.
The first such base was opened by China in Djibouti last year and it acquired the Hambantota port of Sri Lanka on 99 years lease for debt swap and currently developing the Gwadar port in Pakistan as part of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
China is involved in maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas. It claims almost all of the South China Sea and has also laid claims on the Senkaku islands under the control of Japan in the East China Sea, believed to harbour vast natural resources below their seabed.
The US has been periodically deploying its naval ships and fighter planes in the South China Sea to assert freedom of navigation in the disputed areas.
Yu Yongqiang, a researcher with the Institute of Atmospheric Physics — also under CAS — and a member of the expert panel overseeing China’s global underwater surveillance network, said that while it undoubtedly represented progress in China’s submarine warfare capabilities, it was dwarfed by the systems operated by the U. S. around the world.
“We have made just a small step in a long march,” he said.
For submarines patrolling the sea route, or “road”, element of China’s global trade and infrastructure development plan known as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, which included the 21st century Maritime Silk Road, the system’s ability to not only measure, but also predict temperature and salinity at any location, any depth and at any time will be invaluable.
Submarines use sonar (sound navigation and ranging) to locate, identify and attack other vessels.
Mr. Yu said that as well as improving their targeting ability, the new surveillance system should enable submarines to steer a much safer course through difficult waters.
For the naval forces charged with guarding the maritime Silk Road, there are many adversaries lurking in often hostile waters, according to a researcher involved in the development of the new surveillance system.
Since the Cold War, the U. S. had closely guarded the Western Pacific via “island chains”, the researcher said.
Similarly, the South China Sea was circled by many small, “unfriendly” countries involved in territorial disputes with China; while India was wary of Beijing’s growing influence in the region and was consequently trying to tighten its grip on the Indian Ocean, he said.
“Our system can help tip the balance of power in these regions in China’s favour,” the researcher said.
According to a study by the Centre for a New American Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, by 2030 China will have 260 warships and submarines compared to the US’s 199.
As the battle for the oceans hots up, tools such as the underwater surveillance network could be the difference between winning and losing, the report said.
Receba o melhor do Hindu entregue na sua caixa de entrada todos os dias!
Por favor insira um endereço de e-mail válido.
Versão impressa | Feb 23, 2018 9:02:25 AM | thehindu/news/international/china-develops-underwater-surveillance-networks-in-indian-ocean-scs/article22350365.ece.
Weinstein apologizes to Streep, Lawrence for lawyers’ words.
Pressure grows on Australian deputy leader to quit amid new allegations.
Armed deputy who failed to confront gunman at Florida school resigns.
Clarify on Trump Jr.’s India tour: Senator.
India is ignoring facts, says Maldives.
Ivanka Trump will attend Olympics finale.
Democratic Senator seeks clarification on Trump Jr’s India tour.
U. K. university teachers go on strike.
Pakistan moves against terrorists “superficial, reversible”: U. S.
Russian opposition leader Navalny detained over illegal protest.
Police lock down part of Brussels amid reports of gunman.
Who is Dinesh D’Souza and why is he in the news?
Nawaz Sharif criticises Pakistan Supreme Court verdict disqualifying him as ruling party head.
‘Highly concerned’ China probing possible violation of UN curbs on North Korea.
China denies holding talks with Baloch militants to protect CPEC.
In Syria, a father says last goodbye to dead child.
Taliban attack local police in central Ghazni, killing 8: official.
Indian Sikh’s turban ripped outside UK parliament in ‘racist’ attack.
Pakistan given 3-month reprieve over terrorist financing watchlist.
N. Korea to send delegation to Olympics closing ceremony, meet S. Korea's Moon.
Pakistan to take over assets of Hafiz Saeed's JuD, and FIF.
JuD runs sixty schools and hundreds of madrassas along with six hospitals and has more than 150 ambulances.
Women's Marches across the US protest against Trump administration.
Thousands of women and their male supporters turned out on January 20, 2018 across the the United States for the second Women's March, to protest.

Fire Earth.
Earth is fighting to stay alive. Mass dieoffs, triggered by anthropogenic assault and fallout of planetary defense systems offsetting the impact, could begin anytime!
Tagged with Indian Ocean.
Tropical Cyclone STAN: Red Alert Issued in WA.
Destructive winds, storm surges, flooding threaten towns as cyclone approaches Western Australia.
Tropical Cyclone STAN threatens northwest Pilbara region in Western Australia (WA) with potentially destructive wind gusts and heavy rain when the system makes landfall early on Sunday morning.
The storm, currently a category 2 system, is forecast to intensify to category three cyclone before landfall. Red alert has been issued for coastal communities between Port Hedland and Wallal, including Pardoo, Eighty Mile and Wallal. Storm surges may pose additional threats of damaging waves and dangerous flooding due to the tide, said Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology (BOM). For the latest updates visit the BOM website.
M6.5 Quake Strikes Andaman Sea near Nicobar Islands.
SEISMIC HAZARD.
Strong Quake, Significant Aftershocks Occur E of Mohean, Nicobar Islands.
Centered at 7.769°N, 94.325°, the quake struck at a depth of about 10km on Friday 21, 2014 at 13:41:07 UTC, according to the USGS/EHP.
At least 8 significant aftershocks followed, as of posting.
Explanation Map for Seismotectonics of the Sumatra Region (Partial). Source: USGS.
Event Time: 2014-03-21 13:41:07 UTC.
Location: 7.769°N 94.325°E depth=10.0km (6.2mi)
113km (70mi) E of Mohean, India 234km (145mi) NNW of Sabang, Indonesia.
Super BRUCE Winds Reach 265km/h.
EXTREME CLIMATIC EVENT.
Super Cyclonic Storm BRUCE intensified to 265km/h winds.
Super Cyclonic Storm BRUCE maximum sustained winds reached a top speed of 265km/h with gusts of about 315km/h earlier today, according to FIRE-EARTH models.
At 13:00UTC, Super BRUCE was positioned near 19.0ºS 78.0ºE, tracking WSW at about 20km/hr and generating maximum significant wave height of about 15 meters.
Super Cyclonic Storm BRUCE. Water Vapor [FIRE-EARTH Enhancement] Satellite image – recorded at 12:30UTC on December 22, 2013. The mass in the bottom left is Cyclone AMARA. The original Image Sourced from: CIMSS/SSEC/WISC.
[Credits and acknowledgments: FIRE-EARTH Models input data from various satellites and sources including ESA, NOAA, JTWC …]
Links Relacionados.
BRUCE Becomes a Super Cyclonic Storm December 21, 2013 BRUCE could Intensify to a Super Cyclonic Storm December 20, 2013 Tropical Cyclones AMARA and BRUCE December 19, 2013.
BRUCE Becomes a Super Cyclonic Storm.
EXTREME CLIMATIC EVENT.
BRUCE is now a Super Cyclonic Storm with 0.8 certainty.
FIRE-EARTH Models show BRUCE has strengthened to a S uper Cyclonic Storm with 80 percent certainty, packing winds of over 255 km/h at about 04:00UTC on December 21, 2013.
Position: Near 15.0ºS, 84.3ºE.
Maximum Sustained Winds: 255+ km/h.
Maximum Wind Gust: 320 km/h.
Significant Wave Height: 15m.
Movement: WSW (250 degrees) at 25km/h.
[Note: FIRE-EARTH Models input data from various sources including ESA, NOAA, JTWC and others.]
Super Cyclonic Storm BRUCE. VIS/SWIR [FIRE-EARTH Enhancement] Satellite image – recorded at 04:30UTC on December 21, 2013. Original Image Sourced from: CIMSS/SSEC/WISC.
Point of No Return.
In 2004¹, our team forecast an 80-90 percent increase in the total power dissipated annually by tropical cyclones in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by 2015.
Storms will continue to get stronger (develop greater average intensities) and survive at high intensity for longer (take more time to dissipate peak energy) resulting in substantial increases in storm-related losses in the near future.
[1. First draft posted by MSRB on Internet on February 26, 2005]
BRUCE could Intensify to a Super Cyclonic Storm.
Cyclone BRUCE could strengthen to a Super Cyclonic Storm – probability: 0.23.
FIRE-EARTH models show Cyclone BRUCE could potentially intensify to a Super Cyclonic Storm packing sustained winds of about 255 km/h with probability of 23 percent.
Approximate location of Cyclone BRUCE as of 07:00UTC on December 20, 2013 marked on CIMMS SST map.
FIRE-EARTH Estimates – at 11:00UTC on December 20, 2013.
Cyclone AMARA (TC 03S) was located near 18.5ºS, 64.9ºE packing winds of about 215Km/hr. Cyclone BRUCE (TC 04S) was located near 13.8ºS, 87.7ºE with sustained winds of about 230Km/hr.
Cyclones AMARA (TC 03S) and BRUCE (TC 04S). IS/SWIR [FIRE-EARTH Enhancement] Satellite image – recorded at 09:30UTC on December 20, 2013. Original Image Source: CIMSS/SSEC/WISC.